Disagreement-induced CEO turnover

Sheng Huang (First Author), Johan Maharjan (Participant Author), Anjan V. Thakor (Participant Author)

科研成果: 期刊稿件期刊论文

123 下载量 (Pure)

摘要

We propose and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover, and examine its implications for the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on optimal decisions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Theory suggests that such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms; we document that this induces them to sometimes replace CEOs who investors disagree with, controlling for firm performance. A lower level of CEO-investor disagreement serves to partially “protect” CEOs from being fired, thus reducing turnover-performance sensitivity, which we also document. We also show that firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Using various empirical strategies, we rule out other confounding interpretations of our findings. We conclude that disagreement, independently of firm performance, affects forced CEO turnover.
源语言英语
期刊Journal of Financial Intermediation
43
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2020

Corresponding author email

thakor@wustl.edu

关键词

  • CEO turnover
  • Corporate governance
  • Heterogeneous beliefs
  • Investor-management disagreement

成果物的来源

  • ABDC-A*
  • Scopus
  • SSCI

指纹

探究 'Disagreement-induced CEO turnover' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。

引用此