We examine the valuation impact of bank-financed M&As and the loan contracts used to finance M&A transactions, focusing on the difference between bank-dependent acquirers and other acquirers. We find that bank-financed deals have higher acquirer’s CARs relative to other cash M&A deals, but this certification effect exists only for bank-dependent acquirers. Despite bank-dependent acquirers being more susceptible to hold-up, banks do not impose higher loan pricing or more stringent non-price terms on them. After completion of the acquisition, bank-dependent acquirers retain the M&A financing banks for a much larger share of their borrowing needs, suggesting the importance of repeat business for lack of hold-up. Our findings highlight the positive aspects of bank dependence and the importance of implicit contracting for the lack of hold-up in lending markets.
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jan 2020|
SourceChina Europe International Business School (CEIBS)
- Bank Dependence
- Bank Financing
- Creditor Monitoring