Board connections and crisis performance: Family, state, and political networks

Richard W. Carney (First Author), Travers Barclay Child (Participant Author), Xiang Li (Participant Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal

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Abstract

We introduce a novel concept of network interactions in which board connections provide access to external spheres of political influence, state ownership, and family control. We posit this form of indirect access via board association enables connected firms to benefit from information privy to external networks while avoiding their resource-based costs of membership. Board network data are assembled for 1290 East Asian firms and linked to hand-collected data on political connections and corporate ownership around the 2008–09 crisis. Companies with board connections to state-owned firms and family business groups had greater crisis-period accounting performance and stock returns. In countries with weak institutional development, board connections to politically connected firms were also beneficial.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume64
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Corresponding author email

carney.richard@ceibs.edu

Project name

grant

Project sponsor

其他

Project No.

608109

Keywords

  • Board networks
  • Corporate ownership
  • Firm performance
  • Political connections

Indexed by

  • ABDC-A*
  • Scopus
  • SSCI

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