Lay Rationalism and Inconsistency between Predicted Experience and Decision

Christopher K. Hsee, Jiao Zhang, Fang Yu, Yiheng Xi

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    Abstract

    Decision-makers are sometimes depicted as impulsive and overly influenced by ‘hot’, affective factors. The present research suggests that decision-makers may be too ‘cold’ and overly focus on rationalistic attributes, such as economic values, quantitative specifications, and functions. In support of this proposition, we find a systematic inconsistency between predicted experience and decision. That is, people are more likely to favor a rationalistically-superior option when they make a decision than when they predict experience. We discuss how this work contributes to research on predicted and decision utilities; we also discuss when decision-makers overweight hot factors and when they overweight cold factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)257-272
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Behavioral Decision Making
    Volume16
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2003

    Corresponding author email

    chris.hsee@gsb.uchicago.edu

    Project sponsor

    University of Chicago Graduate School of Business; National Science Foundation; China Europe International Business School

    Keywords

    • rationale
    • rationalism
    • rule
    • decision utility
    • experienced utility
    • predictedutility
    • consumption experience
    • inconsistency
    • preference reversal

    Indexed by

    • ABDC-A
    • SSCI

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