Ownership Structure and Insider Trading: Evidence from China

Qing He (First Author), Oliver Meng Rui (Participant Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal

22 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the information content of insider transactions in China and analyze how ownership structures shape market reaction to these transactions. We find that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to insider purchases is a convex function of the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. Further, the CAR to insider purchases is lower when the largest shareholder is government-related, or when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow rights. We also find that the market reaction to insider purchases is more positive for firms audited by Big4 auditors. However, we do not find a significant relationship between an ownership structure and the market reaction to insider sales. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, corporate insider identities, and recent corporate news releases on price-sensitive events. Finally, we show that market reaction to insider purchases is larger for firms with less severe expropriations, as captured by the use of other receivables.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)553-574
JournalJournal of Business Ethics
Volume134
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Corresponding author email

qinghe@ruc.edu.cn, oliver@ceibs.edu

Project name

Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University

Project sponsor

其他

Project No.

NCET-11-0495

Keywords

  • Audit quality
  • CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
  • China
  • EMERGING ECONOMIES
  • INFORMATION-CONTENT
  • INVESTOR PROTECTION
  • Insider trading
  • LAW
  • MARKETS
  • Ownership structure
  • PERSPECTIVE
  • PRICE
  • TRADES
  • WORLD

Indexed by

  • FT
  • ABDC-A
  • Scopus
  • SSCI

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