Rivalry between strategic alliances

Anming Zhang (First Author), Yimin Zhang (Participant Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal

39 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

Rivalry between strategic alliances is investigated in a model where each alliance member maximizes its own profit and some share of its partner's profit. A complementary alliance confers a strategic advantage by allowing the partners to credibly commit to greater output, owing to both within-alliance complementarities and cross-alliance substitutabilities. Although rivalry between different alliances can sometimes lead to a Prisoners' Dilemma for firms, it tends to improve economic welfare. On the other hand, an alliance that arises due purely to the threat of entry may reduce welfare.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)287-301
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume24
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Corresponding author email

anming.zhang@sauder.ubc.ca

Keywords

  • AIRLINE INDUSTRY
  • CONDUCT
  • Competing strategic alliances
  • ENTRY-DETERRENCE
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • HORIZONTAL MERGERS
  • International airline alliances
  • MARKETS
  • OLIGOPOLY
  • Partial alliance
  • R-AND-D
  • Supermodularity

Indexed by

  • ABDC-A
  • Scopus
  • SSCI

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