Tunneling or Not? The Change of Legal Environment on the Effect of Post-Privatization Performance

Guoqian Tu (First Author), Fang Yu (Participant Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal

Abstract

Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s (Am Econ Rev 94(3):753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance (PPP) of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)491-510
JournalJournal of Business Ethics
Volume129
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Corresponding author email

fyu@ceibs.edu

Keywords

  • Ethics
  • Investor protection
  • Law and finance
  • Privatization
  • Tunneling

Indexed by

  • FT
  • ABDC-A
  • Scopus

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