我国“走出去”企业的最优融资模式选择——基于信息经济学的视角 The Optimal Financing Mode of ODI Firms in China： From the Perspective of Asymmetric Information

我国“走出去”企业具有显著的债权融资偏好，过度“杠杆化”运营累积了极高的信用风险。本文建立信息经济学理论模型，分析了企业拥有关于项目风险的私有信息时，能够最大化企业期望利润的均衡债务水平以及能够最大化社会福利的社会最优债务水平，并以此探讨企业过度债务依赖行为的微观机理。研究发现，项目风险越大，或东道国风险越大，或者税率较高，都会导致企业过度债务依赖现象越严重。本文的研究有助于针对“走出去”企业的过度“杠杆化”现象，为我国金融支持“一带一路”企业对外投资的政策体系提出建议。 Chinese ODI firms have a prominent tendency for debt financing, overreliance on which has accumulated a dangerously high level of credit risk. In this paper, based on a theoretical model of information economics, we investigate the micro - mechanism of firms＇ overreliance on debt when firms have private information about their project riskiness, by analyzing the equilibrium debt level that maximizes firms＇ expected profit and the socially equilibrium debt level that can maximize social welfare. It is found that the problem of debt overreliance is more severe if the financed projects are riskier, or if host country risk is higher, or if firms are imposed on a higher tax rate. Our findings are helpful to put forward useful suggestions from this respect for our financial supporting policy system to promote Chinese ＂Belt and Road＂ firms to better conduct international investments.