摘要
The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.
源语言 | 英语 |
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期刊 | International Economic Review |
期 | Early Access |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 2021 |
Corresponding author email
kschung@hkbu.edu.hkProject name
;;RGC of HKSAR;;HKBUProject sponsor
National Social Science Fund of ChinaProject No.
71473141;;GRF14514416;;RC-IG-FNRA/17-18/01成果物的来源
- ABDC-A*
- SSCI
指纹
探究 'CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
Che, J., Qiao, X., & Chung, K.-S. (2021). CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE. International Economic Review, (Early Access). https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12523