Information Design of Online Platforms

T. Tony Ke; Song Lin; Michelle Y. Lu

Information Design of Online Platforms

T. Tony Ke, Song Lin, Michelle Y. Lu

市场营销学

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节 › 会议稿件 › 同行评审

摘要

We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers' search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising decision. Drawing on Bayesian persuasion, we posit that the platform can design a public signal that influences the beliefs of both consumers and sellers. Upon observing the signal, a consumer can conduct a sequential search with perfect recall among the sellers. After visiting a seller, the consumer observes the product price and whether the product is a match or not. Sellers set prices and decide how much to bid in an ad auction for each consumer, where the winner is granted a prominent position. The consumer can obtain the price and match information of the seller in the prominent position at no cost, but incur search cost to visit additional sellers.

源语言	英语
主期刊名	EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
出版地点	London, United kingdom
页	912 -
出版状态	已出版 - 2023

书目注释

Bayesian;Can design;Consumer search;Information design;Online platforms;Personalizations;Platform design;Product recommendation;Sequential search;Targeted advertising;

访问文件

http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597770

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全文

引用此

@inproceedings{b22377749b2f4090b382d8f2d5a0aa80,

title = "Information Design of Online Platforms",

abstract = "We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers' search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising decision. Drawing on Bayesian persuasion, we posit that the platform can design a public signal that influences the beliefs of both consumers and sellers. Upon observing the signal, a consumer can conduct a sequential search with perfect recall among the sellers. After visiting a seller, the consumer observes the product price and whether the product is a match or not. Sellers set prices and decide how much to bid in an ad auction for each consumer, where the winner is granted a prominent position. The consumer can obtain the price and match information of the seller in the prominent position at no cost, but incur search cost to visit additional sellers. {\textcopyright} 2023 Owner/Author(s).",

keywords = "Information use, Marketing, Product design",

author = "{Tony Ke}, T. and Song Lin and Lu, {Michelle Y.}",

note = "Bayesian;Can design;Consumer search;Information design;Online platforms;Personalizations;Platform design;Product recommendation;Sequential search;Targeted advertising;",

year = "2023",

language = "English",

pages = "912 --",

booktitle = "EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Information Design of Online Platforms

AU - Tony Ke, T.

AU - Lin, Song

AU - Lu, Michelle Y.

N1 - Bayesian;Can design;Consumer search;Information design;Online platforms;Personalizations;Platform design;Product recommendation;Sequential search;Targeted advertising;

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers' search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising decision. Drawing on Bayesian persuasion, we posit that the platform can design a public signal that influences the beliefs of both consumers and sellers. Upon observing the signal, a consumer can conduct a sequential search with perfect recall among the sellers. After visiting a seller, the consumer observes the product price and whether the product is a match or not. Sellers set prices and decide how much to bid in an ad auction for each consumer, where the winner is granted a prominent position. The consumer can obtain the price and match information of the seller in the prominent position at no cost, but incur search cost to visit additional sellers. © 2023 Owner/Author(s).

AB - We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers' search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising decision. Drawing on Bayesian persuasion, we posit that the platform can design a public signal that influences the beliefs of both consumers and sellers. Upon observing the signal, a consumer can conduct a sequential search with perfect recall among the sellers. After visiting a seller, the consumer observes the product price and whether the product is a match or not. Sellers set prices and decide how much to bid in an ad auction for each consumer, where the winner is granted a prominent position. The consumer can obtain the price and match information of the seller in the prominent position at no cost, but incur search cost to visit additional sellers. © 2023 Owner/Author(s).

KW - Information use

KW - Marketing

KW - Product design

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 912 -

BT - EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

CY - London, United kingdom

ER -

Information Design of Online Platforms

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