摘要
We conduct an audit study in which a pair of simulated patients with identical flu-like complaints visits the same physician. Simulated patient A is instructed to ask a question that showcases his/her knowledge of appropriate antibiotic use, whereas patient B is instructed to say nothing beyond describing his/her symptoms. We find that a patient who displays knowledge of appropriate antibiotics use reduces both antibiotic prescription rates and drug expenditures. Such knowledge also increases physicians’ information provision about possible side effects, but has a negative impact on the quality of the physician–patient interactions. Our results suggest that antibiotics abuse in China is not driven by patients actively demanding antibiotics, but is largely a supply-side phenomenon.
源语言 | 英语 |
---|---|
页(从-至) | 933-949 |
期刊 | Journal of Health Economics |
卷 | 30 |
期 | 5 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 2011 |
Corresponding author email
jcurrie@princeton.edu, wlin@gsm.pku.edu.cnProject name
新型农村合作医疗的筹资、支付与补偿制度:以健康管理为核心Project sponsor
国家自然科学基金Project No.
70903003关键词
- Antibiotics
- China
- Physician
- Prescription
成果物的来源
- ABDC-A*
- SCIE
- Scopus
- SCI
- SSCI
- PubMed