Personal financial incentives, corporate governance, and firms' campaign contributions

Viktar Fedaseyeu, Lev Lvovskiy

科研成果: 期刊稿件期刊论文

摘要

We find that corporate governance and executives’ personal financial incentives are important determinants of firms’ ability to extract benefits from political participation. Firms with more independent boards are more likely to establish corporate political action committees (PACs), and executives in such firms exhibit a stronger sensitivity of campaign contributions to their personal equity stakes. We also show that disperse ownership limits PACs’ ability to raise funds because even large firm-level benefits from political participation may become insignificant for individuals with small equity stakes. This may help explain why aggregate PAC contributions remain relatively small compared to the large firm-value benefits such contributions can provide. However, the negative effect of disperse ownership on political donations is mitigated by corporate governance, as well-governed firms are able to better align their managers’ incentives with the benefits from corporate political participation.
源语言英语
文章编号102724
页数25
期刊Journal of Corporate Finance
91
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 4月 2025

成果物的来源

  • ABDC-A*
  • SSCI

指纹

探究 'Personal financial incentives, corporate governance, and firms' campaign contributions' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。

引用此

Fedaseyeu, V., & Lvovskiy, L. (2025). Personal financial incentives, corporate governance, and firms' campaign contributions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 91, 文章 102724. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102724