摘要
Rivalry between strategic alliances is investigated in a model where each alliance member maximizes its own profit and some share of its partner's profit. A complementary alliance confers a strategic advantage by allowing the partners to credibly commit to greater output, owing to both within-alliance complementarities and cross-alliance substitutabilities. Although rivalry between different alliances can sometimes lead to a Prisoners' Dilemma for firms, it tends to improve economic welfare. On the other hand, an alliance that arises due purely to the threat of entry may reduce welfare.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页（从-至） | 287-301 |
| 期刊 | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| 卷 | 24 |
| 期 | 2 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 2006 |
Corresponding author email
anming.zhang@sauder.ubc.ca关键词
- AIRLINE INDUSTRY
- CONDUCT
- Competing strategic alliances
- ENTRY-DETERRENCE
- EQUILIBRIUM
- HORIZONTAL MERGERS
- International airline alliances
- MARKETS
- OLIGOPOLY
- Partial alliance
- R-AND-D
- Supermodularity
成果物的来源
- ABDC-A
- Scopus
- SSCI
指纹
探究 'Rivalry between strategic alliances' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
Zhang, A., & Zhang, Y. (2006). Rivalry between strategic alliances. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(2), 287-301. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.04.005