摘要
In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution—in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders—such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes place at the “right” time, (ii) it goes easy on corrupt low-rank officials, and (iii) the government is reasonably centralized. Failing any of these, such a partial reform would lead to rampant corruption throughout the government hierarchy—an outcome far worse than retaining leader immunity.
源语言 | 英语 |
---|---|
页(从-至) | 15-26 |
期刊 | Journal of Public Economics |
卷 | 170 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 2019 |
Corresponding author email
kschung@hkbu.edu.hkProject name
老龄化和人口政策对我国教育和人力资本积累、养老保障和经济增长的影响Project sponsor
国家自然科学基金Project No.
71473141关键词
- Autocracy
- Corruption
- Hostage motive
- Leader immunity
- Party elites
成果物的来源
- ABDC-A*
- Scopus
- SSCI