Venture Capital Financing and the Informativeness of EarningsManagerial Shareholding and Compensation Structure, Investment Opportunities and Non-Audit Service Purchases: An Alternative Explanation

Jieping Chen (First Author), Xijia Su (Participant Author), Gopal Krishnan (Participant Author), Jun Du (Participant Author)

科研成果: 期刊稿件期刊论文

摘要

The rise of fees paid to incumbent auditors for non-audit services (NAS) relative to audit fees has been actively debated by the accounting profession, investors, and regulators. Although accounting firms are banned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act from providing non-auditing services to their auditees, the debate is far from over. Despite the negative publicity generated by NAS purchases, why do managers continue to purchase increasing quantities of NAS? We contribute to this debate by offering an alternative explanation on determinants of NAS purchase decisions. We find that (1) the association between NAS purchases and earnings management documented in extant literature is affected by the way top managers are compensated and by managers' shareholdings, and (2) NAS purchases are positively associated with the proportion of performance-based compensation paid to the top five executives and this association is more pronounced for firms with high investment opportunities.
源语言英语
页(从-至)191-213
期刊Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics
16
2
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2009

关键词

  • Non-audit services
  • audit fees
  • compensation
  • investment opportunities
  • performance

成果物的来源

  • ABDC-B
  • SSCI

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