CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE

Jiahua Che; Xue Qiao; Kim-Sau Chung

doi:10.1111/iere.12523

CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE

Jiahua Che (First Author), Xue Qiao (Participant Author), Kim-Sau Chung (Participant Author)

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal

2 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

Original language	English
Journal	International Economic Review
Issue number	Early Access
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12523
Publication status	Published - 2021

Corresponding author email

kschung@hkbu.edu.hk

Project name

;;RGC of HKSAR;;HKBU

Project sponsor

National Social Science Fund of China

Project No.

71473141;;GRF14514416;;RC-IG-FNRA/17-18/01

Indexed by

ABDC-A*
SSCI

Access to Document

10.1111/iere.12523Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

OpenUrl availability

Full text

Cite this

@article{fabc035990c84d3ea3a5129ddbd7beb4,

title = "CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE",

abstract = "The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.",

author = "Jiahua Che and Xue Qiao and Kim-Sau Chung",

year = "2021",

doi = "10.1111/iere.12523",

language = "English",

journal = "International Economic Review",

issn = "0020-6598",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

number = "Early Access",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE

AU - Che, Jiahua

AU - Qiao, Xue

AU - Chung, Kim-Sau

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

AB - The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit-based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

UR - https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=ceibs_wosapi&SrcAuth=WosAPI&KeyUT=WOS:000660122300001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS

U2 - 10.1111/iere.12523

DO - 10.1111/iere.12523

M3 - Journal

SN - 0020-6598

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

IS - Early Access

ER -

CAREER CONCERNS, BEIJING STYLE

Abstract

Corresponding author email

Project name

Project sponsor

Project No.

Indexed by

Access to Document

OpenUrl availability

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this