Do Capital Markets Punish Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Myopic Research and Development Cuts

JY Tong, FD Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal

2 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

The literature provides conflicting arguments and mixed results regarding whether capital markets punish managerial myopia. Using managers cutting research and development (R&D) investments to meet short-term earnings goals as a research setting, this study reveals that capital markets penalize managerial myopia, especially for firms with high investor sophistication. Moreover, the negative market reactions to managerial myopia are weaker for firms with overinvestment problems than for those without such problems. Overall, the results support the notion that security markets are not shortsighted. In further analysis, we document that compensation, especially earnings-based compensation, may cause managers to behave myopically. Our study contributes to the literature, reconciling previously mixed findings by capturing managers’ myopic behavior in a more targeted way and showing that markets punish myopic R&D cutting.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 6 Dec 2023

Indexed by

  • ABDC-A*
  • FT
  • SSCI

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