Optimality of the 51:49 equity structure

Susheng Wang (First Author), Tian Zhu (Participant Author)

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal


As an extension of Wang and Zhu (2005), this short paper shows that the popular 51:49 equity structure can be optimal. This equity structure in joint ventures (JVs) has puzzled economists the world over. We find that, when the two parties are highly asymmetric in their abilities to acquire private benefits from their JV, the 51:49 equity structure is optimal and as efficient as joint control.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)270-273
JournalEconomics Letters
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Corresponding author email



  • 51:49 equity structure
  • Control rights
  • Income rights
  • Joint control

Indexed by

  • ABDC-A
  • Scopus
  • SSCI


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