Abstract
In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution—in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders—such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes place at the “right” time, (ii) it goes easy on corrupt low-rank officials, and (iii) the government is reasonably centralized. Failing any of these, such a partial reform would lead to rampant corruption throughout the government hierarchy—an outcome far worse than retaining leader immunity.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 15-26 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 170 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Corresponding author email
kschung@hkbu.edu.hkProject name
老龄化和人口政策对我国教育和人力资本积累、养老保障和经济增长的影响Project sponsor
国家自然科学基金Project No.
71473141Keywords
- Autocracy
- Corruption
- Hostage motive
- Leader immunity
- Party elites
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- ABDC-A*
- Scopus
- SSCI