When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation, executive core self-evaluation, and firm performance

Daniel Han Ming Chng (First Author), XB Song (Participant Author), MS Rodgers (Participant Author), E Shih (Participant Author)

科研成果: 期刊稿件期刊论文

39 引用 (Web of Science)

摘要

We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self-evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self-evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors.
源语言英语
页(从-至)1343-1362
期刊Strategic Management Journal
33
12
DOI
已出版 - 2012

Corresponding author email

dchng@ceibs.edu

关键词

  • core self-evaluation
  • ethical behavior
  • incentive compensation
  • organizational decline
  • strategic risk taking

成果物的来源

  • FT
  • ABDC-A*
  • Scopus
  • SSCI

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