TY - JOUR
T1 - Auditor Communication Provisions in Private Loan Agreements
T2 - Do They Matter?
AU - Cheng, Lin
AU - Jaggi, Jacob
AU - Michas, Paul N.
AU - Schatzberg, Jeffrey
PY - 2023/10/26
Y1 - 2023/10/26
N2 - We examine auditor communication provisions (ACPs) in private loan agreements, which are private contracting mechanisms between external auditors and audit clients which establish communication between lenders and their borrowers' auditors. We provide evidence that lenders value privately-contracted auditor communication and often specify multiple ACPs that facilitate lender monitoring. In terms of debt contracting outcomes, we find ACPs are associated with a lower ex ante likelihood of loan covenant violation. We also examine audit fee implications for the borrower and find that ACPs are associated with higher audit fees, which is consistent with auditors responding to the litigation risk these provisions impose. We corroborate this by providing evidence that this relationship is concentrated in samples where the risk of third-party litigation is greater. Finally, we find evidence that ACPs lead auditors to become more conservative as their clients exhibit lower signed discretionary accruals when the risk of third-party litigation is greater.
AB - We examine auditor communication provisions (ACPs) in private loan agreements, which are private contracting mechanisms between external auditors and audit clients which establish communication between lenders and their borrowers' auditors. We provide evidence that lenders value privately-contracted auditor communication and often specify multiple ACPs that facilitate lender monitoring. In terms of debt contracting outcomes, we find ACPs are associated with a lower ex ante likelihood of loan covenant violation. We also examine audit fee implications for the borrower and find that ACPs are associated with higher audit fees, which is consistent with auditors responding to the litigation risk these provisions impose. We corroborate this by providing evidence that this relationship is concentrated in samples where the risk of third-party litigation is greater. Finally, we find evidence that ACPs lead auditors to become more conservative as their clients exhibit lower signed discretionary accruals when the risk of third-party litigation is greater.
KW - Loan agreements
KW - Auditor communication provisions
KW - Information asymmetry
KW - Auditor litigation risk
KW - Audit fees
KW - Auditor conservatism
UR - https://papers.nonprod.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433846
U2 - 10.2308/AJPT-2021-059
DO - 10.2308/AJPT-2021-059
M3 - Journal
SN - 0278-0380
JO - Journal of Practice and Theory
JF - Journal of Practice and Theory
ER -