摘要
This paper examines the relation between corporate lobbying and fraud detection. Using data on corporate lobbying expenses between 1998 and 2004, and a sample of large frauds detected during the same period, we find that firms’ lobbying activities make a significant difference in fraud detection: Compared to nonlobbying firms, on average, firms that lobby have a significantly lower hazard rate of being detected for fraud, evade fraud detection 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by regulators. In addition, fraudulent firms on average spend 77% more on lobbying than nonfraudulent firms, and they spend 29% more on lobbying during their fraudulent periods than during nonfraudulent periods. The delay in detection leads to a greater distortion in resource allocation during fraudulent periods. It also allows managers to sell more of their shares.
源语言 | 英语 |
---|---|
页(从-至) | 0022-1090 |
期刊 | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
卷 | 46 |
期 | 6 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 2011 |
Corresponding author email
fyu@ceibs.edu关键词
- lobbying firms
成果物的来源
- FT
- ABDC-A*
- Scopus
- SSCI
指纹
探究 'Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
Yu, F., & Yu, X. (2011). Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(6), 0022-1090. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000457