Rent-Seeking Incentives, Corporate Political Connections, and the Control Structure of Private Firms: Chinese Evidence

Jieping Chen (First Author), Xijia Su (Participant Author), Zengquan Li (Participant Author), Zheng Su (Participant Author)

科研成果: 期刊稿件期刊论文

265 引用 (Web of Science)

摘要

We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms1 listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.
源语言英语
页(从-至)229-243
期刊Journal of Corporate Finance
17
2
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 2011

Corresponding author email

ccharles@ceibs.edu

关键词

  • Emerging markets
  • Political connections
  • Rent-seeking incentives

成果物的来源

  • ABDC-A*
  • Scopus
  • SSCI

指纹

探究 'Rent-Seeking Incentives, Corporate Political Connections, and the Control Structure of Private Firms: Chinese Evidence' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。

引用此