摘要
In this study, we examine whether emphasized tone in earnings releases systematically predict managers' insider trading activities in the post earnings releases periods and whether managers' choices of tone placement in earnings releases are motivated by opportunistic incentives. We find that, holding constant the net tone of the overall document, managers make more insider sales (purchases) immediately after earnings releases when positive (negative) tone is presented more prominently in the document. In addition, we document that the relation between tone emphasis and the observed insider trading activities is more (less) pronounced when insiders have greater information advantage or when a firm's overall information environment is more opaque (when a firm has better corporate governance). Overall, our findings suggest that managers use narrative characteristics strategically to facilitate their insider trading and achieve personal gains.
源语言 | 英语 |
---|---|
文章编号 | 102419 |
页数 | 21 |
期刊 | Journal of Corporate Finance |
卷 | 80 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 1月 2023 |
成果物的来源
- ABDC-A*
- SSCI
指纹
探究 'Tone emphasis and insider trading*' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
Cheng, L., Jin, Q., & Ma, H. (2023). Tone emphasis and insider trading*. Journal of Corporate Finance, 80, 文章 102419. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102419