摘要
Based on 16,604 observations between 1994 and 2006, this study revisits the ‘horizon problem’ by examining how CEO retirement affects conditional accounting conservatism. We hypothesize and find that firms become less conservative in their financial reporting before the retirement of their CEOs, and that strong corporate governance mitigates the effect of CEO retirement. The literature concerning the horizon problem has suggested that CEOs manipulate earnings to boost short-term performance before they leave their companies (Dechow, P. M., & Sloan, R. G. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14(1), 51–89; Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1982). Incentive and tax effects of executive compensation plans. Australian Journal of Management, 7(2), 139–157), but the evidence is mixed. By examining conditional conservatism, we avoid some of the methodological difficulties that confront researchers when examining either real or accrual earnings management. Ours is the first study to provide evidence on how the horizon problem shapes conditional accounting conservatism.
源语言 | 英语 |
---|---|
页(从-至) | 437-465 |
期刊 | European Accounting Review |
卷 | 27 |
期 | 3 |
DOI | |
出版状态 | 已出版 - 2017 |
Corresponding author email
nserene@shu.edu.cn成果物的来源
- ABDC-A*
- Scopus
- SSCI
指纹
探究 'CEO Retirement, Corporate Governance and Conditional Accounting Conservatism' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
Chen, S., Zhang, F., & Ni, S. X. (2017). CEO Retirement, Corporate Governance and Conditional Accounting Conservatism. European Accounting Review, 27(3), 437-465. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2017.1279065